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Abstract 
 
Following the recent terrorist attacks in Paris, the European media emphatically pronounced 
that billions of euros were wiped from tourism related stocks.  This comes at a troublesome 
time for the tourism industry, in the midst of a global financial crisis, and the unpredictable 
rise of radical Islamic ideologies, which have caused chaos in the Middle East and Europe. 
The relationship and vulnerability of the industry to non-macro incidents have been well 
documented in the literature, mostly in theoretical terms. Nevertheless, the quantifiable 
impact of such events on tourism-specific stock values, both in terms of returns and volatility, 
received much less attention. With the use of an econometric methodology, the paper aims to 
enhance our conceptual capital pertaining to the effects of such possibilities on five 
hospitality and tourism stock indices.  The empirical findings are of interest to stakeholders at 
all echelons of the spectra of the tourism and financial industries. 
 
Keywords: Tourism, Terrorism, Stock Market, Event Study, GJR, Econometric Modeling.    
JEL: C21, C58, G01, H12, Z32. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 November 13th, 2015.  Paris came under attack from radical Islamists, resulting in the 
death of 130 individuals from at least 26 countries. The perpetrators, believed to be ISIS 
related, deliberately attacked sport, leisure and entertainment venues, all related to the 
tourism industry, in their attempt to cause mass casualties and strike fear in the heart of 
Europe. The following day, financial markets suffered extensive losses, with estimates 
suggesting that more than €2bn had been wiped off European travel and hotel shares 
(Wearden & Allen, 2015).   
A similar scenario was repeated immediately following the March 22nd, 2016 Brussels 
attacks at the Zaventem International Airport and the Maelbeek subway station, again tourism 
related targets, with European stocks experiencing more heavy losses (Smout, 2016). Both 
events unequivocally demonstrated the diachronic vulnerability of tourism related stocks to 
acts of political instability, especially terrorism. Nevertheless, the specificities of this 
vulnerability are still a barren landscape, thus necessitating the full attention of tourism 
industry stakeholders.    
Tourism is a multi-billion global social phenomenon with implications for almost all 
aspects of modern societies.  Projections by the World Tourism Organization (WTO, 2014) 
portray a promising picture for the sector, with more than 1.8 billion individuals traveling 
until the year 2030.  Unfortunately, the values and norms governing day-to-day tourism 
operations, along with its global exposure and volatile response qualities, portray the industry 
as a ‘convenient’ target for acts of political instability. Moreover, the post-event generated 
global coverage, fueled in recent times by the 24-hour news media frenzy, the internet, and 
social networks, provides unprecedented publicity to such events, thereby influencing 
geostrategic interests, regional and global policies and, of vital importance to the tourism 
industry, travel attitudes and behavior. 
There is an extensive literature on the relationship between incidents of political 
instability (such as terrorism and wars) and ‘Acts of God’ with the tourism industry. For the 
past forty years, terrorism surfaced as the industry’s primary ‘adversary’, with a multitude of 
terrorist groups targeting its superstructure and infrastructure as a vital mean to promote their 
own ideological agendas.  In the early 1970’s, the European continent experienced severe 
forms of transnational terrorism attributed to the rise of numerous Marxist/Leninist extremist 
groups, whereas in the Middle-East the issue of Palestine instigated the rise of groups, most 
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notably the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), which extensively used 
aircraft hijackings in their revolutionary struggles (Sönmez, 1998). During that turbulent 
period, airports, commercial aircraft, hotels, public mass transportation systems, restaurants, 
cruise liners, leisure venues, and nightclubs, became ‘an ideal target of choice’, causing a 
severe loss of human lives, including innocent bystanders and tourists.         
Following the end of the Cold War in 1991, the global community experienced the 
rise of Islamic fundamentalism, with Al Qaeda orchestrating, a decade later, the devastating 
September 11th, 2001 attacks in the USA, with detrimental effects for the tourism industry 
(Goodrich, 2002). This group, responsible for hundreds of attacks which  destabilized the 
Middle East and other regions of the world for almost a decade, was gradually restrained, 
following two major War conflicts, in Iraq (2003-2011) and Afghanistan (2001-2014), and 
the death of Al Qaeda’s founder, Osama bin Laden, in 2011.  Following Al Qaeda’s demise, 
the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIS or ISIL) surfaced as the most formidable terrorist 
group in recent times. By espousing an ultra-radical ideology based on an extremist 
interpretation of Islam, which promotes religious violence, the Islamic State (IS) is 
responsible for numerous barbaric acts to terrorism, most of which have directly targeted 
tourists.  
Attacks directed by and/or linked to the Islamic State, include, among others, the Paris 
attacks (November 13, 2015), the Tunisia Beach resort attack (June 26, 2015), which cost an 
estimated $515 million in lost revenues (Cadavez, 2016), and the downing of a Russian 
passenger jet over Sinai, Egypt (October 31, 2015) which killed 224 tourists departing from 
their vacations from Sharm el Sheikh.  The attack outside the popular Red Sea resort had an 
estimated revenue loss of $843 million just in the first three months following the incident 
(Kholaif, 2015). 
In addition to terrorism incidents, tourism suffered severely by unanticipated ‘Acts of 
God’ and pandemics, and other incidents of political instability, such as War conflicts and 
economic crises. The literature suggests that such unexpected incidents negatively affect the 
‘economics’ of tourism, in a multitude of ways, since the pure essence of the industry, 
unfortunately, makes it a ‘probable first casualty’ in such eventualities.  Indicatively, Chen et 
al. (2007) suggest that the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic outbreak of 
2003 caused an approximate 29% decline in Taiwanese hotel stock prices, whereas the 2004 
Indian Ocean Tsunami caused the death of 300,000 individuals, including thousands of 
western tourists, at an estimated economic cost of $10 billion (Sharpley, 2005). In terms of 
financial crises, numerous studies (Chen, 2007; Chen, Kim, & Kim, 2005) have investigated 
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the impact of macro variables on hotel stock returns, with Brent Ritchie, Molinar, and 
Frechtling (2010) suggesting the enhanced vulnerability of the industry during economic 
recessions compared with other economic sectors.   
Responding to the urgent need for conceptual clarity, scholars investigated the 
relationship between tourism and incidents of instability, with emphasis on terrorism, from an 
array of different perspectives. Aligned with the characteristics and narrative of each era, 
scholars measured the impact and effect of events for the industry (Enders, Sandler, & Parise, 
1992; Saha & Yap, 2014), developed destination-recovery strategies (Blake & Sinclair, 
2003), proposed destination-image restoration tactics (Avraham, 2013), introduced holistic 
strategic disaster/crises management approaches (Mansfeld, 1999), and propounded 
destination-specific anti-terrorism strategies (Paraskevas & Arendell, 2007).  Despite the 
extensive coverage, numerous scholars (Chan, Lim, & McAleer, 2005; Paraskevas, Altinay, 
McLean, & Cooper, 2013) have argued that the severity and urgency of the topic, especially 
due to the substantial cost increase of conducting day-to-day business (Chen & Siems, 2004), 
necessitates research that expand the collective conceptual capital in metrics and controls, 
both of which are essential in managing knowledge in tourism crises.     
A foray into the most popular academic databases reveals the scarcity of studies 
measuring the effects of such incidents on financial markets, in general, and the hospitality 
and tourism related stocks and indices, in particular (Chen et al., 2007; Drakos, 2004).  
Despite some notable attempts to investigate partially tourism-related topics, mostly in the 
sphere of macro-incidents (see, for example, Chen, 2011; Chen, Jang, & Kim, 2007; Zheng, 
Farrish, & Kitterlin, 2016), the existing literature fails to respond convincingly to a number of 
questions surrounding the behavior and reaction of hospitality and tourism-specific stock 
indices following major non-macro incidents. 
This subtext, which cannot be ignored, suggests that the susceptibility, exposure and 
reaction (behavior) of market-specific stock sectors to pertinent incidents may significantly 
differ based on the type, strength and perceived repercussions of the event (Aslam & Kang, 
2015; Chesney, Reshetarb, & Karamana, 2011). Indicatively, Chesney et al. (2011) suggested 
that the insurance and airline industry sectors are more vulnerable to terrorism, whereas the 
banking sector is mostly affected by financial downturns.  Moreover, they argue that financial 
markets react differently to unpredictable natural catastrophes (Acts of God) compared with 
terrorism-related incidents, especially in the post-event period.  
Echoing similar reasoning, Brounrn and Derwall (2010) posited that industries 
directly affected by an incident (for example, the airline industry in the aftermath of the 
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September 11th, 2001 attacks in the USA) exhibit stronger reactions that may not be 
adequately portrayed in generic market indices. Moreover, Essaddam and Karagianis (2014) 
introduce a regional aspect to the ‘equation’ by suggesting that the attributes, and perceived 
national risk (Chen, 2007), of the specific country suffering the attack may influence the 
overall impact. It is, therefore, imperative that empirical investigations focus their attention to 
the behavior of specific sectors, rather than following the norm of investigating the overall 
stock market’s sentiment, such as the effect on the FTSE 100 index.   
Responding to this emerging need, this paper aims to enhance the existing conceptual 
capital by econometrically investigating five hospitality/tourism stock indices’ reactions to 
150, manually compiled, incidents (Acts of Terrorism, ‘Acts of God’, War conflicts) covering 
the period from January 2000 until February 2016. Moreover, the inclusion of additional 
variables aims to enhance our understanding by addressing pertinent questions, such as 
whether the characteristics of each incident affects stock reaction (returns) and volatility 
(uncertainty or risk) (see, McAleer, 2015). Empirical findings of importance to stakeholders 
should pave the way for meaningful contributions and interventions to current industry 
practices, both at the operational and strategic levels.     
 
2. Non-Macro events of Instability and Stock Markets’ Behavior 
 
 Scholars investigating the impact of shocks to stock markets classify incidents into 
macro and non-macro, with the first being more ‘popular’ in research endeavors. As 
suggested by Chen (2007, p. 992), macro variables “…generally consist of industrial 
production growth rate, inflation rate, growth rate of money supply, yield spread, changes in 
unemployment rate, growth rate of imports and changes in exchange rates.”  In contrast, non-
macro variables, the focus of the current paper encompass, among others, natural disasters, 
Wars, and terrorist attacks (Chen, 2007).  Chen’s study concluded that the impact of macro-
variables on hotel stocks is far more clear and decisive, compared with non-macro variables, 
since other externalities, such as the country’s risk, may influence investors’ expectations.        
Studies exploring the impact of non-macro events associated with terrorism and 
natural catastrophes on financial markers reach a consensus in suggesting the existence of an 
adverse effect (Arin, Ciferri, & Spagnolo, 2008; Charles & Darne, 2006; Eldor & Melnick, 
2004; Nikkinen & Vähämaa, 2010). Despite the fact that the negative direction of the 
relationship is unambiguous, the externalities of the event’s magnitude and the post-event 
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recovery period are contested issues.  Indicatively, Chesney et al. (2011) suggested that two- 
thirds of the terrorists’ attacks investigated in their study caused a significant negative effect 
on stock markets. Charles and Darne (2006) argued that the shock, both permanent and 
temporary, is extensive, whereas Brounrn and Derwall (2010) posited that terrorist attacks 
produce mildly negative price effects on stock market prices.  It is, therefore, prudent to 
conclude that methodological heterogeneities, the specificities of the actual event, and the 
target-destination idiosyncrasies, influence the overall impact; a notion that is also supported 
by Essaddam and Karagianis (2014).                   
 The stock market’s recovery period following an incident has also captured the 
attention of scholars. Overall, research suggests that such incidents cause drastic, but short-
term transitory effects on stock markets, especially on the first day, with recovery in most 
cases occurring within one to two days (Brounrn & Derwall, 2010; Chesney et al., 2011; 
Drakos, 2010). Kollias, Papadaumou and Stagiannis (2011), by contrasting the stock behavior 
following the attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005), suggested that recovery may be 
affected by both the type of the attack, and the promptness and adequacy of the country’s 
institutional responses, an argument that is supported by Essaddam and Karagianis (2014), 
and Aslam and Kang (2015). With regard to volatility, the literature suggests a significant 
increase for up to 15 days following the incident (Drakos, 2004; Essaddam & Karagianis, 
2014), with some suggesting that this effect is larger in emerging markets (Arin et al., 2008).     
 The event’s specific characteristics have surfaced as a vital element of stock market 
reaction.  Indicatively, Brounrn and Derwall (2010) suggested that terrorism incidents have a 
greater economic impact, especially on the day of the event, compared with unanticipated 
natural catastrophes, whereas Chesney et al. (2011) argued that the latter exhibit longer post-
event impact due to the delay in measuring their actual catastrophic effects. Moreover, Aslam 
and Kang (2015) posited that the location, type, intensity (measured by the number of 
fatalities), and tactics of the attack affect stock market behavior, whereas Essaddam and 
Karagianis (2014) argued that the geographic location in which the attack occurred 
influenced its overall impact. Kollias et al. (2011), by comparing the attacks in Madrid (2004) 
and London (2005), suggested that London’s market was able to rebound faster due to the 
fact that the attackers were suicide bombers, so that the imminent security danger ceased to 
exist. From a different perspective, Zussman and Zussman (2006) argued that markets react 
differently to Israeli’s controversial policy of assassinating Palestinian political and military 
leaders, with the first causing strong negative reactions, while Eldor and Melnick (2004) 
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suggested that Palestinian attacks on transport infrastructure caused a transitory effect on the 
Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE).                  
As previously noted, the country’s institutional response in such eventualities also 
plays a significant role in post-event market behavior.  Countries whose financial institutions 
were equipped with informed contingency plans were able to mitigate the negative effects of 
such incidents (Kollias et al., 2011), with the United Kingdom being a perfect example, 
following the 2005 London bombings. The same scholars argued that contingency plans, 
developed in the aftermath of the September 11th, 2001 attacks in the USA, involving the vast 
majority of the country’s financial stakeholders, helped mitigate the negative effects, thereby 
ensuring smooth trading in the United Kingdom financial markets.   
In the hospitality literature, notable studies have been conducted by Ming-Hsiang 
Chen, mostly in the Chinese, Japanese and Taiwanese business settings.  His conceptual 
reasoning, which revolved around the investigation of macro and non-macroeconomic 
variables, particularly hotel performance measurements, profitability, and stock performance 
(Chen, 2007; 2011), was an extension of Barrows and Naka’s (1994) seminal work, which 
investigated the influence of macroeconomic variables on restaurant and hotel stock returns 
of companies in the USA.  Espousing a similar reasoning, others investigated the impact of 
mostly macroeconomic variables on hospitality and tourism-related stock indices.  
Indicatively, Wong and Song (2006) exemplified the dependence of hospitality stock indices 
in the USA on macroeconomic variables, with interest rates being the most significant, 
whereas Leong and Hui (2014) investigated pertinent topics in Singapore.  Despite the fact 
that findings provide evidence of dependencies, at different levels and degrees, for both 
macro and non-macro incidents, other externalities may have a confounding effect on this 
relationship. 
                  
2.1 Econometrics and Pertinent Studies 
 
Econometric modeling has received considerable attention during the past twenty 
years, with applications ranging from forecasting cycles and risk, assessing and analyzing the 
impact of events, and modeling turning points and directional changes.  The diverse nature of 
research using econometric techniques in the tourism literature has been highlighted by Song 
and Li (2008), who attempted to expand our horizons into new ‘uncharted’ territories of 
empirical investigations. Despite the newfound popularity, to the best of our knowledge, no 
tourism-related study has ever used advanced econometrics in investigating the effect of 
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political instability incidents to the industry’s stock indices. The vast majority of related 
studies, which have used extensively econometric techniques in their analysis, derive from 
the generic business, finance and economics literature.   
Indicatively, Drakos (2010) used pooled panel ARCH to model the effects of 
terrorism activities on the investor’s psychosocial sentiment. Chesney, Reshetarb, and 
Karamana (2011) used a filtered GARCH–EVT approach to study the impact of incidents on 
stock behavior. Kollias, Papadaumou and Stagiannis (2011) applied the GARCH model to 
investigate the effects of two major terrorist incidents occurred in the European continent, 
whereas Essaddam and Karagianis (2014), using GARCH, examined the volatility of stock 
returns following a terrorist event. Peren, Ciferri, and Spagnolo (2008) explored the effect of 
terrorist attacks on financial markets which, according to the authors, “…has not received the 
same level of attention (compared to the short-term effects on major macroeconomic 
variables)” (p. 164).  It is important to note that despite the methodological similarities, the 
data used in the studies exhibited heterogeneities that restrict any attempt to reach definite 
and generalizable conclusions. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
The primary purpose of the paper is to measure econometrically the effects of 
instability incidents (Terrorism, ‘Acts of God’, and War Conflicts) on hospitality/tourism 
stock indices that are currently trading in international stock markets. In particular, five 
hospitality/tourism-related stock indices from different regions, namely FTSE Travel and 
Leisure World, FTSE Travel and Leisure Asia Pacific, FTSE Travel and Leisure Australia, 
FTSE Travel and Leisure America, and FTSE Travel and Leisure Europe, were selected for 
analysis from Thomson Reuters Datastream. These five indices (henceforth H/T indices) 
cover the vast majority of hospitality, tourism and leisure organizations from around the 
globe, and so are considered to be ideal for our purposes. Their selection was also based on 
numerous study-specific criteria, such as the region covered, years of data coverage (going 
back to 2000), and volume and content. Moreover, the inclusion of additional variables may 
further dissect this relationship, thereby enhancing the existing body of knowledge. In 
particular, variables such as the geographic location of incidents, fatalities caused, type and 
place of the attack, affiliation of the perpetrators, and subsequent media exposure, may 
provide a more comprehensive view of stock market reaction to such eventualities.   
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Therefore, reflecting upon the extant literature and addressing the primary purposes of 
the paper, the following seven research questions are postulated:   
 
RQ1a: Do terrorist attacks have a significant effect on H/T stock indices (that is, 
returns and volatility)? 
RQ1b: Do ‘Acts of God’ have a significant effect on H/T stock indices (that is, returns 
and volatility)? 
RQ1c: Do War conflicts (day of declaration) have a significant effect on H/T stock 
indices (that is, returns and volatility)? 
RQ2: Does the geographic location of the incident of instability affect H/T stocks 
(that is, returns and volatility) in the regional and/or global financial markets? 
RQ3: What is the impact on H/T stocks from incidents causing tourist fatalities? Is 
there a difference according to the number of fatalities (severity)?  
RQ4: What is the impact on H/T stocks from incidents involving attacks on tourism 
infrastructure / superstructure (such as restaurants, hotels, and airports)? 
RQ5: Does the type of attack [perpetrators killed from suicide attacks or apprehended 
during the attack, versus perpetrators who were later apprehended or are still at large] 
influence the effect on H/T stock indices (that is, returns and volatility)? 
RQ6: Does the affiliation of the attackers (known terrorist organization versus Lone 
Wolves) influence the effect on H/T stock indices (that is, returns and volatility)?  
RQ7: Does media exposure influence the effect on H/T stock indices (that is, returns 
and volatility)? 
 
 For the empirical analysis, a database including 150 incidents occurring in the World 
after 2000 was manually compiled from various internet sources.  For each incident, data 
pertaining to its characteristics, namely date, category of the event (Terrorism, ‘Acts of God’, 
War conflict), geographic location (country / region), tourist fatalities (number), 
infrastructure/superstructure involved (tourist related, such as hotels, restaurants, and 
airports), type of attack (perpetrators killed or apprehended during the attack versus 
perpetrators that were later apprehended, or are still at large), affiliation of the attack (known 
terrorist organizations versus Lone Wolf attacks), and media exposure, were collected.  It is 
important to indicate that each incident included in the database had to be verified from at 
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least two independent sources. Note that some variables are not related with all types of 
incidents (such as Acts of God). 
 
4. Econometric Models   
 
4.1 Impact of Various Events on Returns and Volatility 
 
As previously stated, the paper investigates the sensitivity of returns and volatility of 
H/T indices in reaction to 150 study-specific incidents. In particular, and following the 
discussion in the previous section, two questions are addressed: 
 
 Is there a change in the returns, considering the reaction of the market during and after 
the event/shock? 
 Is there a change in the volatility considering the reaction of the market during and 
after the event/shock? 
 
Subsequently, the GJR specification of Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle (1993) is 
used to model the autoregressive returns (denoted rt) augmented by the appropriate dummies 
and their conditional variance (volatility), denoted ht (also augmented by appropriate 
dummies).  Moreover, the returns were modelled by an autoregressive process of order 1 to 
account for possible autocorrelation1: 
 
1 1 , , ,t t j j t tr c r d u       (1) 
 
and the conditionally heteroskedastic error term, ut , was assumed to follow the asymmetric 
process according to the GJR specification (see, McAleer, 2014): 
 
t t tu h e , 
(2) 
 
2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 , , ,( 0)t t t t t j j th e e e h d              . (3) 
 
                                                            
1 The innovations, et , are assumed independently and identically distributed. In order to account for non-
normality in the returns shocks, the parameters were estimated by quasi-maximum likelihood (QML).  
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in which the parameters γ1  and α1 are positive, and β1 lies in the range (-1, 1). 
The exponential GARCH (EGARCH) model of Nelson (1991) is also asymmetric, but 
the underlying stochastic process has no regularity conditions, and hence has no asymptotic 
statistical properties (McAleer & Hafner, 2014).  
The variables denoted dj,t,τ are dummy variables indicating the existence of an event 
described in research question j (j=1, 2, …., 7) during period t. It is equal to 1 if there is such 
an event, and 0 otherwise.  The index τ indicates an observation window: 
 
1. Concurrent event period (τ =0) captures the effects of the event on returns and 
volatility on the same date. 
2. A period after the event (τ =1, 2, 3 …) captures the effects of the event on returns and 
volatility the following days.2 
 
If these dummies are significant, it can be inferred that the events described in the research 
questions have impacts on returns and/or volatility. 
As for the remaining variables, they are explained as follows: In equation (1), the 
coefficient φ1 captures the lagged effects of the returns (that is, whether the previous day’s 
returns affect current returns), while in equation (3), the coefficients α1 and β1 capture the 
short-run persistence and contribution to the long-run persistence of volatility. Finally, the 
coefficient γ1 captures the asymmetry in volatility (that is, whether negative shocks have a 
greater impact on volatility compared with positive shocks of the same magnitude). 
 
5. Empirical Findings 
 
5.1 Research Questions 1(a,b,c): Terrorist Attacks, ‘Acts of God’, and Wars impact on H/T 
Stock Indices   
 
 The first research question investigates whether terrorist attacks have a significant 
effect on hospitality / tourism stocks indices, both in terms of returns and volatility (RQ 1a). 
As shown in Table 1, the results indicate a significant negative impact on H/T stock indices 
in all regions, except Australia.  In all cases, the indices were not affected by the specific 
event on day t (the day of the terrorist attack), but they dropped significantly on the following 
                                                            
2 In practice, only the day after the event has an effect on either returns or volatility, so that in estimation we 
used only τ =0 and τ =1. 
13 
 
day.  In comparison, the next day drop of European indices was considerably larger (-0,360; p 
= 0,007) compared with the American, Asia Pacific and World indices. With regard to 
Australia’s index, which revealed insignificant results, a plausible explanation may revolve 
around the country’s isolated geographical location and national risk, which makes it less 
vulnerable and susceptible to such shocks.      
When investigating the volatility caused by terrorist attacks on H/T stock indices, 
with the exception of Australia, the results indicate a significant positive impact on the day of 
the event. Volatility is considerably higher for the European stock index, which continued to 
record significant increases on the day following the event, while in the Asia/Pacific this 
dropped the day after the event.  In contrast, despite the volatility increases on the day of the 
event, the World and America indices remained unaffected on the following day. This 
behavior may be attributed to the different reactions of each market to specific shocks.  
Subsequent analysis, using impulse response functions (see the following paragraphs), 
suggested that both the price drop and volatility increase fully recovered to their pre-event 
levels 2 to 3 days following the incident. Therefore, it is prudent to suggest that the overall 
impact of such shocks is short term.           
 
INSERT TABLE 1 
 
 With similar reasoning, the paper investigated the impact of ‘Acts of God’, widely 
defined as events outside human control, such as tsunami and earthquakes, for which no one 
can be held responsible (RQ1b). Despite the fact that the findings exhibited an overall similar 
trend with terrorist attacks, certain differences are noteworthy (see Table 2). Specifically, 
‘Acts of God’ had a significant negative impact on all five H/T stock indices (returns) on the 
day of the event, which continued on the following day for the World, American and 
European indices. The overall effect for these indices for both days was identical, whereas the 
Asia Pacific and Australian indices exhibited insignificant drops on the day after the incident.  
With regard to volatility, the findings revealed positive impacts on the day of the event for 
the Asia Pacific, European, Australian and American stock indices, with the latter two also 
exhibiting significant increases on the following day. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 
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War conflicts (day of declaration) had a much different impact on H/T stock indices 
compared with terrorism incidents and ‘Acts of God’ (RQ1c).  In particular, the findings 
presented in Table 3, revealed that such incidents had a significant negative effect only on the 
World stock index (-0,851; p = 0,027) on the day following the War declaration. The findings 
suggest that the uncertainty surrounding such events (for example, the duration of a War 
conflict, and anticipated human and material/economic losses) minimize stock market shocks 
during the first days of the conflict. In contrast, when investigating the volatility caused by 
such events, the findings portrayed a much different picture since the World, American, and 
European stock indices exhibited a significant increase on the day after, whereas the latter 
(European) index also experienced a significant increase on the day of the declaration.   
 
INSERT TABLE 3 
 
Additional analysis with the use of the Impulse Response Function in an AR process 
was conducted to predict the variable’s movements given its past.  This technique illustrates 
how the variable responds to a shock of a specific magnitude, and how long it takes to return 
to its original level.  The findings shown in Figure 1 suggest that the shock from terrorist 
incidents (RQ1a) lasts for 2 to 3 trading days, a result that is consistent with the significance 
of the estimated (event) parameters.  It can be inferred that, although the initial shock of such 
incidents is quite substantial for the first 1-2 days, it dies out in subsequent periods. It is 
important to note that the results are qualitatively similar for the rest of the estimates 
pertaining to ‘Acts of God’, and War conflicts (RQ1b and RQ1c - not presented to save 
space). 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 
  
5.2 Research Question 2 - Geographic Location of the Incident and H/T Stock Indices 
 
 The second research question investigated whether the geographic location in terms of 
the five regions (Europe, America, Asia/Pacific, Australia, and Africa) of the actual attack 
impacts the five H/T stock indices. As shown in Table 4, incidents occurring in America 
(mostly in the USA) had a significant negative impact on the World, Australian and 
American H/T stock indices (note the negative effect at p < 0.10 for the Asia Pacific and 
Europe). Similarly, incidents occurring in Australia had a negative effect, mostly the 
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following day, on stock indices in Asia Pacific, Australia and America, whereas European 
events seem to have a significant effect (negative) only on the European index (-0,399; p = 
0,012) on the following day.  Events occurring in Africa and Asia Pacific did not have any 
significant effect on any of the five indices.  It is apparent that only incidents occurring in 
America influence negatively all H/T indices.  Moreover, the estimated coefficients suggest 
volatility increases (either on the same day of the shock, or on the following day) when 
events occur in Europe or America in almost all markets, whereas there are rather sparse 
spillover effects when events occur in other regions. 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 
 
5.3 Research Question 3 – Tourist Casualties and H/T Stock Indices 
 
The third research question investigated the severity of the event, in terms of both 
reported tourist fatalities and their volume. The findings, presented in Table 5 unequivocally 
indicate that incidents with reported tourist fatalities have a significant negative effect in four 
of the five regional indices (except Asia Pacific) on the day following the event, with the 
World and Australian indices exhibiting the largest negative impact. In terms of volatility, 
almost all indices (except Australia) experienced a significant or marginally significant 
positive impact on the day of the event, with the European index recording the highest effect, 
both on the day of the event and on the following day.      
           
INSERT TABLE 5 
  
The second part of the third question examined whether the number of tourist 
fatalities, a direct reflection of an incident’s severity, impacted upon the H/T stock indices.  
For the empirical analysis, the events were grouped into three distinctive categories, namely 
events with less than 10 fatalities (VICT10), events with 10 to less than 100 fatalities 
(VICT_L100), and events with more than 100 casualties (VICT_G100).  The findings (see 
Table 6) suggested that the higher the number of tourist fatalities, the higher the negative 
impact of these incidents on hospitality and tourism stock indices, especially on the following 
day.  The World, Asia Pacific, and Australian stock indices exhibited a significant negative 
effect on the day of an event, which caused more than 100 tourist casualties. On the following 
day, almost all three categories negatively impacted the indices with some minor exceptions 
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(for example, events with less than 10 casualties have an insignificant effect on the Asia 
Pacific, Australian, American and European indices).   
It is important to note that, on average, the impact of incidents with more than 10 and 
less than 100 victims was more than double compared with the corresponding impact of 
incidents with less than 10 victims. Interestingly, the impact of incidents with more than 100 
victims was more than three times higher than the corresponding impact of incidents with 
more than 10 and less than 100 victims.  Finally, in terms of volatility, all five stock indices 
experienced significant positive effects, both on the day of the event, and on the following 
day, with the Asia Pacific and European indices being more vulnerable to such events.     
 
INSERT TABLE 6 
 
5.4 Research Question 4: Attacks on Tourism Infrastructure / Superstructure and H/T Stock 
Indices  
 
 Historically, the tourism industry surfaced as a convenient target for terrorism groups 
wishing to maximize their radical ideological agendas on the world stage.  The industry’s 
infrastructure/superstructure (such as airports, hotels, restaurants, and leisure venues) have 
been ideal targets, nevertheless, the actual impact of such attacks on H/T stock indices has 
received limited scholarly attention. The findings (see Table 7) suggest that attacks on 
tourism infrastructure cause a significant negative impact on most indices (except for the 
Asia Pacific), mostly on the day following the event.  The European index seems the most 
susceptible to such attacks, especially on the next day (-0,581; p = 0,001), a trend that is also 
evident with regard to volatility. Such attacks caused a significant positive impact on the 
corresponding uncertainty (or risk) of these markets in all regions, again with European and 
Asia Pacific indices recording the highest volatility increases.         
  
INSERT TABLE 7 
  
5.5 Research Question 5: Type of Attack and H/T Stock Indices  
 
 The study’s fifth research question explored whether the type of attack influences H/T 
stock indices. For this purpose, attacks were classified into two distinct categories according 
to the perpetrators’ fate, namely killed or apprehended during the attack (such as suicide 
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bombers), and perpetrators who were later apprehended or were still at large. The results, 
shown in Table 8, indicate that the type of attack was relevant only for the European index 
with a significant negative impact on the following day of the event (-0,380; p = 0,005). It is 
apparent that the type of attack has no direct impact on the other regions’ indices, whereas a 
significant positive impact on stock market uncertainty is revealed in the World (on the day 
of the attack), Asia Pacific and European indices, again with the latter recording the highest 
increase for both days.   
 
INSERT TABLE 8 
 
5.6 Research Question 6: Affiliation of the Attackers and H/T Stock Indices 
 
 Recent literature (Aslam & Kang, 2015) suggests that the specificities of a terrorist 
attack influence its overall impact on financial markets. In order to further explore this 
argument, the affiliation of the attackers, classified into known terrorist organizations (such 
as Al-Qaeda) and Lone Wolves, was examined.  A Lone Wolf is defined as an individual who 
commits an act of violence alone without any logistical support from an organized group, 
despite the fact that he or she may espouse the ideology of a radical group or movement (for 
example, the 2015 Copenhagen Shootings). The findings, presented in Table 9, suggest that 
the attackers’ affiliation is not relevant to any of the five indices under consideration as no 
significant changes are recorded. In contrast, when investigating a market’s volatility, 
significant positive increases are revealed for both the Asia Pacific and European indices, 
both on the day of the event and on the next day.     
 
INSERT TABLE 9 
 
5.7 Research Question 7: Media Exposure and H/T Stock Indices 
 
 The final research question examined whether post-event media coverage impacts on 
H/T stock indices, both in terms of returns and volatility.  Each event’s media coverage and 
exposure was classified as either High/Global or Low/Regional, based on information 
received from various internet sources. The subjective nature of this exercise is 
acknowledged, therefore, the results are presented for purely indicative purposes. The 
findings (see Table 10) indicated that media exposure had a significant negative impact on 
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the four indices (except Asia Pacific), mostly on the day following the incident. With regard 
to market uncertainty (volatility), all five indices experienced a significant increase, mostly 
on the day following the event, with the European index seen as the most susceptible to such 
an effect.  
 
INSERT TABLE 10 
 
5.8 Half-life Volatility Shocks 
 
In an attempt to further investigate the volatility shock persistence for each of the 
seven research questions, the half-life method, defined as ln(0.5)/ ln(a2 + b2), which measures 
the period of time (or number of days) it takes for the shock’s impact to decrease by one-half, 
was used. The particular technique has been used by numerous scholars (see, for example, 
Lamoureux & Lastrapes, 1990) for dissecting the behavior of volatility after a particular 
incident. The findings, presented in Table 11, suggest that volatility shocks, similar to returns, 
appear to be largely transitory in nature, with half-life estimates being around 4 to 5 days for 
most events. Noteworthy differences do exist, both between the five indices under 
consideration, particularly regarding the Asia Pacific index, and according to incidents’ 
characteristics.       
 
INSERT TABLE 11 
 
6. Discussion and Implications  
 
Aligned with existing literature (Brounrn & Derwall, 2010; Chesney et al., 2011; 
Drakos, 2010), the findings suggest that non-macro incidents caused a short-term transitory 
effect on H/T stock indices, with recovery occurring within two to three days.  As revealed, 
differences exist according to the incident type (Terrorist attacks, ‘Act of God’, War 
conflicts), with terrorist attacks recording statistically the most significant drops, especially 
on the day following the event, and ‘Acts of God’ exhibiting drops on the day of the incident.  
In contrast, Wars had an insignificant effect on four of the five study-specific indices (except 
for the World index).   
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The specificities of each event were explored with the use of a number of variables, 
such as geographic location, severity, specific target, type of the attack, perpetrators’ 
affiliation, and post-event media exposure and coverage.  The literature (see Aslam & Kang, 
2015; Chesney, Reshetarb, & Karamana, 2011; Essaddam & Karagianis, 2014) suggests that 
the characteristics of each incident influence its overall impact on both stock market returns 
and volatility. Thus, an enhanced understanding of these parameter estimates would most 
certainly assist stakeholders in predicting the financial consequences of an incident, as well as 
instigating recovery initiatives. The findings suggest that only incidents occurring in the USA 
have a global impact on almost all indices, whereas other incidents mostly affect the 
particular regional stock markets. In terms of severity (referred to in some studies as the 
intensity of the incident), the findings indicate that events resulting in tourist casualties have a 
significant negative impact on all five indices, whereas this impact was exponentially higher 
for incidents with more than 100 fatalities; a notion that is also supported by Aslam and Kang 
(2015).           
Incidents involving attacks on tourism infrastructure and superstructure had a 
significant negative effect on the World, European and American indices, mostly on the day 
following the event. This tends to support Brounrn and Derwall’s (2010) argument that 
industries directly affected or involved in the attack experience considerably stronger effects.  
The type of terrorist attack was also investigated with research (for example, Eldor & 
Melnick, 2004; Kollias et al., 2011) suggesting a number of different scenarios.  For instance, 
Kollias et al. (2011) argued that stock behavior and the subsequent recovery period may be 
affected by the type of the attack, with London (2004) presented as an example of a single 
day recovery due to the incident’s nature (suicide bombings) compared with the Madrid 
attacks in 2005 (where the perpetrators were apprehended a few days later).  This study’s 
findings suggest that the European index is significantly more susceptible to the type of 
attack, both in terms of returns and volatility.             
The affiliation of the perpetrators was investigated, with the reasoning being that 
attacks conducted by known terrorist groups will have a more lasting impact compared with 
Lone Wolf incidents. The findings fail to confirm this argument as no significant changes 
were recorded in any of the five indices. In contrast, market uncertainty is significantly higher 
for both the Asia Pacific and the European indices, thereby suggesting that both regions are 
more vulnerable if the perpetrators’ affiliation is a well-known terrorist group. Finally, and as 
expected, the extensiveness of media coverage, a pragmatic reality when incidents cause 
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international tourists fatalities, influences the event’s overall impact, both on returns and 
volatility.        
With minor exceptions, overall volatility exhibits similar reactions to returns. The 
half-life volatility shock persistence estimates revealed some noteworthy differences, 
especially between the Asia Pacific and the other indices. Nevertheless, in comparison with 
the existing literature, this paper produced no evidence to support claims that, following a 
particular incident, volatility will significantly increase for up to 15 days (as suggested by 
Essaddam & Karagianis, 2014), or that ‘Acts of God’ increase uncertainty more, compared 
with other incidents, due to the observed post-event negative impact (as suggested by 
Chesney et al., 2011).  It would be prudent to encourage further empirical investigation in 
volatility persistence following such incidents.   
     
6.1 Implications 
 
 The capability of financial institutions to predict both the likelihood and probable 
consequences of non-macro incidents is crucial in today’s business environment. With the 
use of an appropriate econometric methodology, this paper aimed to enhance our conceptual 
knowledge as to how the characteristics of each incident (such as type, location, severity, and 
affiliation) affect stock market reactions and behavior, particularly those of the five study-
specific H/T stock indices. Despite the fact that, overall, our findings exhibited similar 
outcomes with several previous studies that investigated pertinent topics in generic business 
indices (such as Brounrn & Derwall, 2010; Nikkinen & Vähämaa, 2010), noteworthy 
implications are of interest to hospitality and tourism stakeholders, including investors, local 
authorities, financial institutions, tourism-service providers (such as tour operators), and 
industry operators.      
The paper indicated that the negative impact of non-macro incidents on hospitality-
specific indices (returns) is short lived and does not last more than 2-3 days. With the 
exception of cataclysmic events, such as the September 11th, 2001 attacks or the 2004 Indian 
Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami, which had an unprecedented psychological impact on 
financial markets caused by the nature, magnitude and severity of the incident (Brounrn & 
Derwall, 2010; Drakos, 2004), financial markets appeared to be efficient and resilient in 
absorbing the initial shock of such incidents (Johnston & Nedelescu, 2006). It is apparent that 
recent past experiences have ‘forced’ the industry to create its own ‘antibodies’ in order to 
self-protect and immune itself to such eventualities. A contributing factor was the fact that, 
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following the aftermath of the September 11th, 2001 attacks in the USA, the majority of 
financial markets, especially those operating in developed countries, undertook drastic 
measures in enhancing their contingency plans and crisis management responses in order to 
mitigate their exposure and vulnerability to such eventualities (Kollias et al., 2011).   
It is, therefore, prudent to suggest that the investors’ negative exposure from such 
events is minimal. Nevertheless, market uncertainty (volatility) is still a topic worthy of 
further investigation. Note that, for investors, high market volatility will severely limit the 
well-established benefits of portfolio diversification, an ideal investment practice for the 
global tourism industry, especially at the international level (Lee, Wu, & Wang, 2007; 
McAleer, 2015). Moreover, this short-term transient effect seems to be inconsistent with 
some recent calls (see, for example, Chesney et al., 2011) to avoid investing in hospitality and 
tourism related stocks due to terrorist-related incidents. 
 The profile of the incident and its geographic location may assist financial institutions 
in better quantifying their risk exposure. For tourism, incidents occurring in developed 
countries (mostly in Europe and the USA), causing tourist fatalities, involving the industry’s 
infrastructure and superstructure and, logically, generating extensive media coverage, thereby 
influencing individuals’ psycho-social state, require immediate attention as they can have a 
significant impact on markets. In contrast, terrorist incidents occurring in Africa, a 
geostrategic region with a ‘rich’ history of political instability, and with numerous ‘active’ 
conflict zones (such as Somalia, Yemen, Libya, Kenya, and Tunisia) have an insignificant 
effect on the study-specific indices. The findings echo the argument of Essaddam and 
Karagianis (2014) that the characteristics of the geographic location in which the incident 
occurred impact on stock markets. 
 At the destination level, the findings have implications for tourism policymakers 
striving to mitigate the negative impact from such events. Depending on the type, impact, 
severity, and location of the incident, stakeholders may undertake specific measures that 
minimize their risk exposure and safeguard the sustainability of their industry. The 
development of pre- and post-event strategies, and the adoption of specific measures by the 
destination’s highest institutions, both political and financial (such as Government, Central 
Bank, Local Authorities, and Regional Stock Markets), will most definitely enhance the 
confidence and trust of current and potential investors and safeguard the industry’s financial 
interests.   
Such targeted measures may include, among others, mitigation tactics and actions 
(post event crisis management and communication), modifications and reconfigurations on 
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existing regulatory financial frameworks (revision of monetary and fiscal policies), 
precautionary/preventive actions (actions to eliminate terrorist finance and related money 
laundering), increased scrutiny to suspicious financial transactions, enhance international 
cooperation and information sharing (cooperation between European Union countries under 
the auspices of the European Central Bank), and inter-and-cross departmental cooperation, 
both domestic and international (cooperation between financial institutions and security/law 
enforcement agencies). Furthermore, hospitality organizations may undertake strategic 
market diversification initiatives, which may encourage, for example, the promotion of 
domestic tourism at destinations that are overly dependent on international markets, thereby 
minimizing the susceptibility to such events.   
One aspect that cannot be ignored is the long-term indirect effects of such incidents 
on the tourism industry. Despite the transient effect on stock markets, such events can 
significantly increase the industry’s cost of doing business. Frey, Luechinger and Stutzer 
(2007) introduced the indirect effects (for example, the cost imposed on the local population) 
of such incidents; effects that cannot be reflected in the next day’s stock market prices and 
returns. Moreover, systemic side effects, which may take time to materialize as they depend 
heavily on each country’s distinctive economic situation and national risk, present an 
intriguing topic worthy of further investigation. Another possible research endeavor is the 
investigation as to whether such incidents have a more direct effect on hospitality 
establishments’ sales and profitability than they do on stock performance. This thematic area 
contains numerous topics that are of interest to industry stakeholders, and are worthy of 
further investigation. 
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Table 1: Terrorism Incidents and H/T Stock Indices 
 
WORLD ASIA PAC AUSTRALIA AMERICA EUROPE 
Results - Mean 
    C 0,030 0,024 0,046 0,039 0,040 
 
(0,040*) (0,180) (0,050*) (0,091) (0,426) 
FTSE(-1) 0,096 0,003 0,017 -0,010 0,055 
(p value) (0,002**) (0,929) (0,471) (0,502) (0,027*) 
TERRORISM 0,022 -0,105 -0,127 -0,069 -0,126 
(p value) (0,899) (0,645) (0,297) (0,587) (0,258) 
TERRORISM(1) -0,131 -0,301 -0,195 -0,202 -0,360 
(p value) (0,017*) (0,049*) (0,128) (0,034*) (0,007**) 
Results - Variance 
    C 0,012 0,023 0,028 0,027 1,300 
 
(0,007**) (0,002**) (0,007**) (0,001**) (0,005**) 
RESID(-1)^2 0,019 0,044 0,033 0,021 0,072 
RESID(-1)^2*(RESID(-1)<0) 0,079 0,048 0,066 0,094 0,011 
GARCH(-1) 0,939 0,925 0,930 0,941 0,588 
TERRORISM 0,214 0,516 -0,009 0,227 0,836 
(p value) (0,014*) (0,004**) (0,935) (0,054) (0,009**) 
TERRORISM(1) -0,071 -0,306 0,130 -0,009 1,461 
(p value) (0,280) (0,004**) (0,584) (0,946) (0,006**) 
 Note: * p <0.05; **p < 0.01
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Table 2: ‘Acts of God’ and H/T Stock Indices 
 WORLD ASIA PAC AUSTRALIA AMERICA EUROPE 
Results - Mean     
C 0,033 0,030 0,005 0,030 0,028 
 (0,058) (0,170) (1,008) (0,171) (0,091) 
FTSE(-1) 0,096 -0,003 0,025 -0,005 0,053 
(p value) (0,001**) (0,821) (0,482) (0,548) (0,004**) 
GOD -1,285 -0,990 -0,168 -1,167 -1,183 
(p value) (0,012*) (0,026*) (0,044*) (0,013*) (0,031*) 
GOD(1) -1,072 -0,725 -0,159 -1,290 -1,048 
(p value) (0,017*) (0,077) (0,672) (0,018*) (0,044*) 
Results - Variance     
C 0,013 0,018 1,859 0,024 0,029 
 (0,009**) (0,008**) (0,002**) (0,009**) 0,009 
RESID(-1)^2 0,019 0,047 -0,030 0,015 0,029 
RESID(-1)^2*(RESID(-1)<0) 0,081 0,051 0,099 0,098 0,121 
GARCH(-1) 0,945 0,922 0,567 0,933 0,913 
GOD -0,356 1,192 2,745 2,007 1,085 
(p value) (0,851) (0,020*) (0,005**) (0,011*) (0,014*) 
GOD(1) 0,615 -0,538 2,752 2,130 -1,054 
(p value) (0,757) (0,486) (0,066) (0,013*) (0,002**) 
Note: * p <0.05; **p < 0.01 
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Table 3: Wars and H/T Stock Indices 
 WORLD ASIA PAC AUSTRALIA AMERICA EUROPE 
Results - Mean      
C 0,041 0,026 0,029 0,021 0,039 
 (0,025*) (0,202) (0,282) (0,329) (0,067) 
FTSE(-1) 0,098 0,006 0,011 -0,006 0,047 
(p value) (0,007**) (0,914) (0,914) (0,664) (0,025*) 
WAR 0,474 0,419 -0,456 1,465 0,191 
(p value) (0,783) (0,468) (0,584) (0,324) (0,795) 
WAR(1) -0,851 -1,015 0,438 -1,119 0,288 
(p value) (0,027*) (0,109) (0,713) (0,229) (0,823) 
Results - Variance      
C 0,188 0,018 0,585 0,142 0,032 
 (0,002**) (0,002**) (0,007**) (0,003**) (0,008**) 
RESID(-1)^2 0,091 0,047 0,186 0,108 0,024 
RESID(-1)^2*(RESID(-1)<0) 0,419 0,051 0,275 0,244 0,121 
GARCH(-1) 0,614 0,918 0,434 0,753 0,912 
WAR 9,965 0,120 -1,032 9,995 2,078 
(p value) (0,058) (0,958) (0,246) (0,083) (0,050*) 
WAR(1) -0,728 -0,002 -0,092 -1,950 -0,880 
(p value) (0,010*) (1,002) (0,833) (0,004**) (0,004**) 
Note: * p <0.05; **p < 0.01 
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Figure 1: Impulse Response Function 
 
 
 
31 
 
Table 4: Geographic Location and H/T Stock Indices 
 WORLD ASIA PAC AUSTRALIA AMERICA EUROPE 
Results - Mean      
FTSE(-1) 0,096 0,008 0,012 -0,016 0,054 
(p value) (0,007**) (0,832) (0,660) (0,375) (0,051) 
EUROPE -0,022 0,127 0,061 0,011 -0,117 
(p value) (0,906) (0,527) (0,833) (0,973) (0,055) 
EUROPE(1) -0,540 -0,306 -0,082 0,005 -0,399 
(p value) (0,070) (0,253) (0,747) (0,987) (0,012*) 
AMERICA -0,480 -0,889 -0,512 -0,820 -0,108 
(p value) (0,014*) (0,063) (0,043*) (0,034*) (0,785) 
AMERICA(1) -0,468 -0,235 -0,416 -0,575 -0,363 
(p value) (0,014*) (0,645) (0,014*) (0,012*) (0,067) 
ASIA -0,259 -0,234 -0,455 -0,088 -0,020 
(p value) (0,178) (0,143) (0,137) (0,764) (0,904) 
ASIA(1) 0,280 0,209 -0,009 0,108 -0,138 
(p value) (0,558) (0,517) (0,983) (0,598) (0,673) 
AUSTRALIA -1,475 -0,700 -0,341 -1,813 -0,443 
(p value) (0,764) (0,876) (0,650) (0,288) (0,396) 
AUSTRALIA(1) -1,702 -0,756 -1,882 -3,101 -1,069 
(p value) (0,638) (0,046*) (0,036*) (0,007**) (0,065) 
AFRICA 0,027 -0,120 -0,112 0,065 -0,017 
(p value) (0,925) (0,508) (0,580) (0,676) (0,887) 
AFRICA(1) -0,026 0,045 -0,107 -0,049 -0,365 
(p value) (0,903) (0,862) (0,727) (0,725) (0,188) 
Results - Variance      
C 1,172 1,255 1,335 0,568 1,396 
 (0,001**) (0,000**) (0,005**) (0,008**) (0,009**) 
RESID(-1)^2 0,035 0,046 0,038 0,144 0,071 
RESID(-1)^2*(RESID(-1)<0) 0,060 0,030 0,034 0,213 0,011 
GARCH(-1) 0,577 0,588 0,577 0,581 0,588 
EUROPE 0,697 0,956 0,951 0,082 0,870 
(p value) (0,057) (0,007**) (0,466) (0,879) (0,017*) 
EUROPE(1) 1,005 1,275 1,278 0,154 1,205 
(p value) (0,016*) (0,004**) (0,223) (0,793) (0,001**) 
AMERICA 2,009 0,515 0,520 1,558 1,646 
(p value) (0,019*) (0,482) (0,757) (0,056) (0,020*) 
AMERICA(1) 2,635 2,669 2,677 0,304 2,263 
(p value) (0,005**) (0,006**) (0,002**) (0,098) (0,025*) 
ASIA 0,965 1,460 1,461 1,442 1,219 
(p value) (0,088) (0,006**) (0,713) (0,021*) (0,012*) 
ASIA(1) 0,627 0,781 0,789 0,943 0,744 
(p value) (0,494) (0,134) (0,442) (0,007**) (0,201) 
AUSTRALIA 0,231 0,275 0,273 0,701 0,014 
(p value) (0,988) (0,884) (0,553) (0,605) (0,998) 
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AUSTRALIA(1) 2,256 2,691 2,695 1,365 3,542 
(p value) (0,921) (0,214) (0,012*) (0,640) (0,008**) 
AFRICA 1,106 1,158 1,156 0,605 0,117 
(p value) (0,001**) (0,004**) (0,011*) (0,110) (0,122) 
AFRICA(1) 0,737 1,007 1,004 0,415 0,138 
(p value) (0,037*) (0,009**) (0,130) (0,208) (0,127) 
Note: * p <0.05; **p < 0.01 
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Table 5: H/T Stock Indices and Tourist Fatalities 
 WORLD ASIA PAC AUSTRALIA AMERICA EUROPE 
Results - Mean      
C 0,030 0,010 0,035 0,026 0,030 
 (0,027*) (0,175) (0,051) (0,086) (0,025*) 
FTSE(-1) 0,086 -0,006 0,011 -0,011 0,031 
(p value) (0,005**) (0,885) (0,454) (0,514) (0,016*) 
Tourist Victims 0,055 -0,061 -0,097 -0,029 0,035 
(p value) (0,675) (0,630) (0,581) (0,871) 0,819 
Tourist Victims(1) -0,308 -0,200 -0,309 -0,434 -0,723 
(p value) (0,007**) (0,074) (0,005**) (0,019*) (0,019*) 
Results - Variance      
C 0,000 0,014 0,022 0,014 0,012 
 (0,003**) (0,009**) (0,003**) (0,008**) (0,005**) 
RESID(-1)^2 0,009 0,042 0,018 0,002 0,001 
RESID(-1)^2*(RESID(-1)<0) 0,073 0,044 0,058 0,088 0,096 
GARCH(-1) 0,932 0,915 0,924 0,932 0,921 
Tourist Victims 0,144 0,346 0,059 0,144 1,695 
(p value) (0,011*) (0,005**) (0,079) (0,046*) (0,001**) 
Tourist Victims(1) 0,017 -0,163 0,088 0,112 2,105 
(p value) (0,832) (0,180) (0,737) (0,059) (0,002**) 
Note: * p <0.05; **p < 0.01 
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Table 6: Severity (number of tourist casualties) and H/T Stock Indices 
 WORLD ASIA PAC AUSTRALIA AMERICA EUROPE 
Results - Mean      
C 0,032 -0,004 0,045 0,033 0,013 
 (0,027*) (0,979) (0,021*) (0,071) (0,558) 
FTSE(-1) 0,085 -0,004 0,004 -0,019 0,040 
(p value) (0,001**) (0,847) (0,517) (0,492) (0,038*) 
VICT10 0,031 -0,304 -0,127 -0,056 0,088 
(p value) (0,900) (0,028*) (0,059) (0,776) (0,781) 
VICT_L100 0,023 0,000 -0,206 -0,051 -0,031 
(p value) (0,836) (0,988) (0,026*) (0,802) (0,798) 
VICT_G100 -0,195 -0,539 -0,247 -0,089 0,015 
(p value) (0,035*) (0,009**) (0,049*) (0,690) (0,969) 
VICT10(1) -0,122 -0,111 0,001 -0,353 -0,173 
(p value) (0,026*) (0,068) (0,966) (0,102) (0,065) 
VICT_L100(1) -0,208 -0,248 -0,205 -0,451 -0,416 
(p value) (0,099) (0,019*) (0,030*) (0,083) (0,002**) 
VICT_G100(1) -0,646 -0,512 -0,634 -0,709 -0,465 
(p value) (0,003**) (0,020*) (0,013*) (0,058) (0,001**) 
Results - Variance      
C 0,005 1,150 0,020 0,023 0,866 
 (0,009**) (0,009**) (0,005**) (0,002**) (0,004**) 
RESID(-1)^2 0,008 0,052 0,019 0,019 0,049 
RESID(-1)^2*(RESID(-1)<0) 0,085 0,045 0,051 0,099 0,119 
GARCH(-1) 0,942 0,572 0,921 0,934 0,574 
VICT10 0,287 0,636 0,554 0,182 1,159 
(p value) (0,005**) (0,034*) (0,016*) (0,028*) (0,042*) 
VICT_L100 0,279 0,807 0,070 0,531 0,639 
(p value) (0,024*) (0,004**) (0,841) (0,014*) (0,010*) 
VICT_G100 0,206 1,350 0,791 0,583 1,279 
(p value) (0,066) (0,005**) (0,023*) (0,051) (0,021*) 
VICT10(1) 0,244 1,294 0,310 0,139 2,235 
(p value) (0,009**) (0,004**) (0,036*) (0,048*) (0,005**) 
VICT_L100(1) 0,081 0,960 0,264 0,176 1,265 
(p value) (0,507) (0,009**) (0,095) (0,047*) (0,008**) 
VICT_G100(1) 0,381 0,688 0,725 0,873 0,643 
(p value) (0,039*) (0,003**) (0,026*) (0,029*) (0,008**) 
Note: * p <0.05; **p < 0.01 
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Table 7: Attacks on Tourism Infrastructure H/T Stock Indices 
 WORLD ASIA PAC AUSTRALIA AMERICA EUROPE 
Results - Mean      
C 0,033 0,009 0,030 0,044 0,037 
 (0,022*) (0,748) (0,044*) (0,060) (0,007**) 
FTSE(-1) 0,089 0,001 0,012 -0,016 0,034 
(p value) (0,010*) (0,909) (0,464) (0,519) (0,021*) 
Infrastructure -0,049 -0,212 -0,111 -0,183 -0,005 
(p value) (0,648) (0,002**) (0,363) (0,163) (0,997) 
Infrastructure(1) -0,228 0,005 -0,255 -0,316 -0,581 
(p value) (0,013*) (0,922) (0,087) (0,041*) (0,001**) 
Results - Variance      
C 0,006 1,062 0,031 0,009 0,013 
 (0,000**) (0,003**) (0,010*) (0,008**) (0,005**) 
RESID(-1)^2 0,019 0,053 0,030 0,015 0,007 
RESID(-1)^2*(RESID(-1)<0) 0,082 0,051 0,061 0,101 0,101 
GARCH(-1) 0,928 0,556 0,932 0,925 0,926 
Infrastructure 0,167 1,063 0,155 0,234 1,088 
(p value) (0,023*) (0,006**) (0,042*) (0,013*) (0,003**) 
Infrastructure(1) -0,010 0,871 0,081 0,051 1,434 
(p value) (0,926) (0,002**) (0,080) (0,790) (0,002**) 
Note: * p <0.05; **p < 0.01
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Table 8: Type of Attack and H/T Stock Indices 
 WORLD ASIA PAC AUSTRALIA AMERICA EUROPE 
Results - Mean      
C 0,034 0,027 0,044 0,029 0,024 
 (0,040*) (0,141) (0,042*) (0,101) (0,653) 
FTSE(-1) 0,087 0,000 0,004 -0,017 0,053 
(p value) (0,002**) (0,849) (0,473) (0,503) (0,040*) 
Attack -0,036 -0,131 -0,196 -0,152 -0,114 
(p value) (0,710) (0,216) (0,127) (0,323) (0,413) 
Attack(1) -0,087 -0,094 -0,190 -0,137 -0,380 
(p value) (0,398) (0,288) (0,144) (0,278) (0,005**) 
Results - Variance      
C 0,002 0,025 0,025 0,022 1,401 
 (0,000**) (0,001**) (0,008**) (0,004**) (0,007**) 
RESID(-1)^2 0,014 0,036 0,036 0,012 0,066 
RESID(-1)^2*(RESID(-1)<0) 0,072 0,041 0,052 0,086 0,032 
GARCH(-1) 0,936 0,917 0,937 0,924 0,594 
Attack 0,240 0,291 0,137 0,220 0,769 
(p value) (0,008**) (0,008**) (0,543) (0,196) (0,000**) 
Attack(1) 0,115 0,231 -0,025 -0,007 1,703 
(p value) (0,134) (0,003**) (0,916) (0,977) (0,002**) 
Note: * p <0.05; **p < 0.01 
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Table 9: Affiliation of Attackers and H/T Stock Indices 
 WORLD ASIA PAC AUSTRALIA AMERICA EUROPE 
Results - Mean      
C 0,025 0,010 0,038 0,019 0,032 
 (0,078) (0,920) (0,100) (0,173) (0,026*) 
FTSE(-1) 0,097 -0,023 0,008 -0,016 0,041 
(p value) (0,008**) (0,007**) (0,449) (0,558) (0,020*) 
Affiliation 0,165 -0,116 0,072 -0,151 0,139 
(p value) (0,285) (0,057) (0,663) (0,439) (0,367) 
Affiliation(1) -0,091 -0,098 0,007 -0,194 -0,535 
(p value) (0,488) (0,139) (0,986) (0,302) (0,082) 
Results - Variance      
C 0,001 0,758 0,021 0,019 0,024 
 (0,002**) (0,006**) (0,001**) (0,000**) (0,009**) 
RESID(-1)^2 0,012 0,094 0,031 0,001 0,017 
RESID(-1)^2*(RESID(-1)<0) 0,074 0,086 0,054 0,087 0,103 
GARCH(-1) 0,947 0,349 0,935 0,942 0,914 
Affiliation 0,101 0,618 0,339 0,096 1,376 
(p value) (0,394) (0,007**) (0,208) (0,739) (0,005**) 
Affiliation(1) 0,010 0,853 0,252 0,128 1,618 
(p value) (0,900) (0,004**) (0,351) (0,627) (0,003**) 
Note: * p <0.05; **p < 0.01 
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Table 10: Media Exposure and H/T Stock Indices 
 WORLD ASIA PAC AUSTRALIA AMERICA EUROPE 
Results - Mean      
C 0,029 0,025 0,040 0,033 0,043 
 (0,031*) (0,145) (0,055) (0,077) (0,026*) 
FTSE(-1) 0,089 0,005 0,011 -0,008 0,043 
(p value) (0,005**) (0,777) (0,489) (0,543) (0,029*) 
Media -0,073 -0,231 -0,179 -0,149 -0,207 
(p value) (0,561) (0,064) (0,025*) (0,046*) (0,025*) 
Media(1) -0,373 -0,162 -0,323 -0,488 -0,870 
(p value) (0,000**) (0,176) (0,017*) (0,021*) (0,014*) 
Results - Variance      
C 0,016 0,018 0,013 0,020 0,011 
 (0,008**) (0,003**) (0,002**) (0,001**) (0,005**) 
RESID(-1)^2 0,019 0,035 0,025 0,000 0,013 
RESID(-1)^2*(RESID(-1)<0) 0,082 0,046 0,063 0,087 0,109 
GARCH(-1) 0,936 0,909 0,926 0,928 0,913 
Media 0,026 0,351 0,234 -0,059 1,165 
(p value) (0,086) (0,007**) (0,046*) (0,892) (0,002**) 
Media(1) 0,207 0,114 0,484 0,488 1,562 
(p value) (0,026*) (0,042*) (0,025*) (0,014*) (0,006**) 
Note: * p <0.05; **p < 0.01 
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Figure 2: Half-life of Volatility Shocks Persistence 
 Region 
W/O  
dummies 
RQ1a 
(Terrorism) 
RQ1b 
(‘Acts of 
God’) 
RQ1c 
(War 
Conflicts) 
RQ2 
(Geograph. 
Location) 
RQ3_fatal 
(Tourist 
Fatalities) 
RQ3_tour
_vic 
(Number 
of Victims) 
RQ4 
(Infrastr. / 
Superstr.) 
RQ5 
(Type of 
Attack) 
RQ6 
(Affiliation) 
RQ7 
(Media 
Coverage) 
WORLD 95.139 5.513 6.098 0.728 0.632 5.755 4.890 4.680 5.219 6.382 5.249 
ASIA PAC 152.826 4.503 4.325 4.118 0.656 0.625 3.934 0.596 4.023 0.340 3.680 
AUSTRALIA 45.331 4.842 0.612 0.462 0.632 4.228 4.424 4.946 5.388 5.241 4.513 
AMERICA 71.438 5.716 5.019 1.267 0.676 5.058 4.907 4.475 4.419 5.835 4.656 
EUROPE 31.226 0.662 3.844 3.777 0.661 0.628 4.185 4.537 0.673 3.847 3.834 
Note: Period of time (Number of days) 
 
